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SUMMARY 
Unconstitutionality of a referendum on fair housing legislation in Rhod e lsland o 
Franci s Bo Kenney , JL 
The General Assembly of the State of Rhode Island i s not c ons t itutionally 
empowered to effectuate a state-wide referendum with respe c t to the issue of fair 
housing under our present Constitution o 
Article 4, Section 1 
"This Constitution shall be the supreme la w of the 
State, and any law incon s istent therewith sha ll be 
void . 11 
Article 4, Section 2 
"The legislative power, under th is Constitution , shall 
be vested in two hou ses, the one to be c alled the 
senate, the other the hou s e of representative s; and 
both together the general assembly o" 
The State Constitution has no provision for the init iative o Its only rela-
tion to referendum is Amendment XXXL Under this provi s ion, the General Asse mbly 
is not empowered to incur an obligation of more than fifty tho us and dollars in the 
absence of war, insurrection 1 or invasion , without a pop ular vote o 
Since the Constitution contains no general refer ence to referendum, it may 
contain no remote reference to referendum concerning fair housingo 
The attached detailed letter 
to Msgr. Geoghegan supports 
th is thesis o 
The Right Reverend Msgr. Arthur T . Geoghegan 
135 Governor Street 
Providence, Rhode Island 
l\!lonsignor : 
July 31, 1963 
One of the key matters tou ched upon in the meeting of Citizens United, 
July 17, 1963 at the home of Mrs. Miller was the legal question whether the 
General Assembly of the State of Rho de Island is constitutionally empowered to 
effectuat e a state -wide referend urn to determine whether fair housing shall be-
come a part of the state of Rhod e Island. 
In my op in ion the General Assembly is not so empowered. 
Article IV of the Con sti tut ion of the State of Rhode Island sections (1) and 
(2) provide: 
"Constitution suprerne . ~ This Constitution shall be the 
supreme law of the state , and any law inconsistent therewith shall 
be void. 
"Power in general assembly - Enactment and style of laws . -
The legislative power, under this Constitution, shall be vested in two 
houses, the one to be call ed the se nate, the other the house of 
representatives; and both tog ether the general assembly." 
In State v. Copeland 3 R . L 33 (1854) defendant was convicted of 
selling liquor between July 1, 1853 and March 18, 1854 contrary to a prohibitory 
statute passed at the January sessi on 1853. Section 19 of the act provided : 
"The legal voters in th e sever al towns, may, at the annual 
election in April next, vote upon the question of repealing this act," 
and, proceeding to provide for the manner of returning and counting 
the votes at the next May session, provides further, that "in the 
event of a majority of such ball ots being cast in favor of the repeal 
of the act, the same shall be limi ted in its operation, and have no 
effect after the tenth day from an d after the rising of the General 
Assembly at said May session. 11 
"In this case, therefo re , the first eighteen sections of the act 
must, for any objection now made, be deemed to have been in force 
from the time of their enactment by the General Assembly in 
January, 1853, and as if the 19th section had not been added ther eto. 
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''Th e provisions of the 19th secti on might as well have been 
made in the object of a distinct and separa te ac t. Had they been 
embodied in such an act , there could be no diffi culty in determining 
the effect. 
"It would be simply an act to repeal an existing act, which 
could be passed by the General Assem bly aloneo If passed in any 
other mode, or by any other body than that prescribed by the 
constitut ion, it would be simply void, and would not affect the act 
which it was de signed to repeal. 
"We are therefore all of opinion that for any objection now 
made , or for anything co ntain ed in the said 19th section, the said act 
is constitutional and valid o 11 
When the Court mentions separatin g the valid parts of the act from the invalid 
parts it must hav e implied that the attempted delegation of legislative power to the 
voters would have been invalid if attempt to apply were madeo 
In 76 ALR 1053 - 1063 the following annotation is headed "Constitutionality of 
Ref erendumo " 
The following is quoted from said annotationo 
11 In the majority of the cases in which the court had before it, 
the validity of general statutes wh ich left to the determination of the 
people of the whole state whet her or not such statutes should become 
effective as laws, the decision is against the validity of the statuteo" 
Just ~efore the annotation, the followi ng case is printed : 
"People of the State of Illinois Ex ReL Charles M. Thomson Vo 
Joseph Ho Barnett et aL, Jury Commissioners of Cook Countyo 
344 IlL 62, 176 NE 108, 76 ALR 1044 (1931) 
"Dunn, Ch. J., deliver ed the opinion of the Court: 
"Upon leave given, a petition was filed at the April term by 
Charles Mo Thom so n, a resident)) ci ti ze n, and taxpayer of the 
county of Cook, praying for a writ of mandamus commanding the jury 
commissioners of the county of Cook to prepare the jury list and 
perform all duties in connection therewith, and to place male persons 
only on such jury lisL The respondents demurred to the petition, 
and the cause has been su bmitted on the petition)) demurrer, and 
briefs of the parties and their oral argumentso 
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"The Fifty-Sixth General Assembly passed a bill for an act to 
amend section 2 of "An Act to authorize judges of cour ts of record 
to appoint jury commissioners and prescribing their powers and 
duties, 11 approved June 15, 1887, as amended (Laws of 1929, p . 538), 
and a bill for an act to amend sections 1 and 4 of "An Ac t concerning 
jurors, and to repeal certain Acts therein named," approved 
February 11, 1894 (Laws of 1929, p . 539) These bills were approved 
by the Governor on June 14 and June 17, 1929, respectively . Each 
act contained this provision : ''This Act shall not be in force unless 
the question of its adoption has been submitted to the legal voters 
of this State and approved by a majority of all the votes cast upon 
the proposition. Such question shall be submitted to such legal 
voters at the general election to be held on Tuesday next after the 
first Monday of November, A. D. 1930." Each act furthur provided 
that, "if a majority of the legal voters of this State voting upon said 
proposition vote in favor of this Act it shall thereby and thereupon be 
in force and effect in this State. " Both acts were submitted at the 
election specified, and a majority of the votes cast on the proposition 
was in each case in favor of the act. The issue presented is the 
constitutionality of these two acts. The petitioner contends : (1) That 
the General Assembly has no constitu tional power to provide for jury 
service by women; (2) that the bills in question were attempted 
delegations of legislative power, contrary to established principles 
of law and to the limitations of the Constitution. In view of the 
conclu sion we have reached on the latter contention, it will be 
unnecessary to consider the former. 
"Thus all the legislative power inherent in the people of the 
state of Illi nois has been vested in the General Assembly, except in 
those cases in which the power has by express limitation or necessary 
implication been withheld. Since it alone has the power, the General 
Assembly has also the duty, and upon it alone rests the full responsi-
bility, of legislation. This power it may not delegate to any other 
officers or persons or groups of persons, or ,even to the whole body 
of the people, or to a majority of the voters of the state voting at a 
general election or at a special electiono The Constitution has made 
no general provision for a referendum of any act of the General Assembly 
to a vote of the people of the whole state to determine whether or not 
that act shall become a law . By secti on 5 of article 11 of the Constitution 
it is provided that no act of the General Assembly authorizing or creating 
corporations or associations with banking powers, nor amendments 
thereto, shall go into effect or in any manner be in force, unless the 
same shall be submitted to a vote of the _I!)eople at the general election next 
succeeding the passage of the same, and be approved by a majority of all 
the votes cast at such election for or against such law. By the amendment 
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of the Constitution which be c ame s ection 34 of article 4 of the 
Constitution, it was provided that no law based on that amendment 
affecting the municipal govern1nent of the city of Chicago should 
take effect until such law should be consented to by a majority of 
the legal voters of the city voting on the question at any election, 
general, municipal, or specia L In c ases of this kind, the General 
Assembly was not only permitted, but was required, to submit its 
action by a referendum to the people of the city or the state, and its 
acts in such cases could not go into effect or in any manner be in 
force until the required majority of voters had consented o 
" Independent of any writt en Constitution, John Locke wrote 
in 1689: "The legislature cannot transfer the power of making 
laws to any other hands, for, it being but a delegated power from the 
people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others o o o 
Legislative action neither must, nor can, transfer the power of 
making laws to anybody else or place it anywhere but where the 
people have." Two treaties of Government, p. 2760 This is the 
general rule of consti tutional law sustained by the weight of 
judicial decisions, though not without the exception of some cases 
which hold that the Legislature may pass a general act rnaking its 
becoming a law expressly dependent upon its approval by a majority 
of voters on a referendum to the people of the whole state. In this 
state it is held that, to sustain an act whose constitutionality is 
drawn in question, it must appear to have been complete when it 
came from the Legislature o Arrns Vo Ayer, 192 IlL 601, 61 No E. 
851, 58 LRA o 277 85 Amo SL Repo 357; Sheldon Vo Hoyne, 261 IlL 
222, 103 N. Eo 1021. Therefore the first primary election law was 
held invalid because, among other reasons, of the provision in 
section 6 that the county central committee of each party should 
determine whether the county officers should be nominated at the 
primary election by the voter or by delegates chosen at such 
election, and also whether the candidates should be nominated by a 
majority or plurality vote, thus delegating to county central committees 
legislative authority to determine what the substantial features of the 
law should be. People Vo Board of Election Com'rso 221 IlL 11, 77 
N. E. 321, 5 Ann. Caso 562$ For a like reason, among others, the 
second primary election law, which conferred on the county central 
committees of political parties powers to designate and establish 
delegate districts and made the entire act dependent for its operation 
upon the action of such committees, was held unconstitutional and 
void in Rouse v. Thompson, 228 IlL 522, 81 No E o 1109. A statute 
which is incomplete in declaring what constitutes a violation of its 
provisions but authorizes a publi c officer or an administrative or 
executive board to determine that question, is invalid as delegating 
legislative power to the offi c er or board. Sheldon v. Hoyne, supra; 
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Board of Admin istration Vo Mil es, 278 IlL 174, 115 No E. 841 ; 
Kenyon v . Moore, 287 UL 233? 122 N. E . 548 ; Schae z lein Vo 
Cabaniss ., 135 CaL 466, 67 P. 755 56 L o R . A. 733, 87 Am o SL Rep o 
122; Hewitt Vo State Board of Med ic al Examiners, 148 Cal. 590? 
84 P. 39, 3 Lo R . A. (N. S. ) 896? 113 Am. St. Repo 315, 7 Ann o Cas. 
750. The cases which have be en ci ted are illustrations of the generally 
recognized rule of law that legislat iv e power may not be delegated . 
In none of them was there a referendum to the people of the state, and 
there fore in none of them did the precise state of facts in this case 
exist. 
11 The exact question in thi s c ase was considered by the Supreme 
Court of Ohio in Cin c innati , Wilmington & Zanesville Railroad Co. 
v. Clinton County Com 'rs, 1 Ohio St., 77; by the New York Court of 
Appeals in Barto v . Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483 , 59 Am. Deco 506, and People 
v. Kennedy, 207 N. Y. 533, 101 N. E. 442, 446, Ann o Caso 1914C, 
616; and by the Supreme Court of California in Ex parte Wall , 48 CaL 
315, 17 Am . Rep . 425. The Supreme Court of Ohio said : "That the 
General Assembly cannot surrender any portion of the legislative 
authority with which it is invested, or authorize its exercise by any 
other person or body :1 is a proposition too clear for argument, and 
is denied by no one . This inability arises no less from the general 
principle applicable to every delegated power requiring know ledge, 
discretion, and rectitude in it s exercise, than from the positiv e 
provisions of the constitution itself. The people, in whom it resided, 
have voluntarily relinquished its exercise, and have positively ordained 
that it shall be vested in the General Assembly. It can only be 
reclaimed by them? by an amendment or abolition of the constituti on, 
for which they alone are competent. To allow the General Assembly 
to cast it back upon them would be to subvert the constitution and 
change its distribution of powers? wi thout their action or con se nt. 
The checks, balances, and safeguards of that instrument are intended 
no less for the protection and safety of the minority than the majority ~ 
hence, while it continues in force, every citizen has a right to demand 
that his civil conduct shall only be regulated by the association wisdom, 
intelligence and integrity of the whole representation of the State . " 
11 111 Barto v o Himrod, supra, it appeared that the Legislature had 
adopted an enactment entitled, "an act establishing free schoo ls through-
out the state, : and had provided by one of the sections, "The electors 
shall determine by ballot at the annual election to be held in November 
next whether this act shall or shall not become a law. " The enactment 
was state-wide in its effect, and did not purport to be a law when it 
left the Legislature, but was submitted to the elect ors. It was merely 
a legislative proposition for a stature e to be passed on by the people, 
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and it was held that this was an unconstitutional attempt by the 
Legislatu re to delegate its powers? and that, even if by the terms 
of the act it had been declared to be a law, to take effect in case 
it should receive a majority of the votes, it would nevertheless have 
been invalid, because the results of a popular vote upon the expediency 
of the law was not such a future event that a statute could be made to 
take effect upon it according to the meaning and intent of the Constitution. 
In People v. Kennedy, supra, the same court stated : "The proposition 
that by our Constitution general powers of legislation are conferred 
exclusively upon the Legislature, and that this body may not escape its 
dutie s and responsibilitie s by delegating such legislative powers to 
the people at large, must be regarded as so thoroughly established 
that it needs no discussion. " The court, referring to the case of 
Barto v. Himrod, supra, stated: "Starting with and fully accepting the 
elementary proposition involved in and declared that the doctrine of 
that case should not be pushed beyond the question there involved and 
that the Legislature may pass a statute which is a completed law 
affecting or conferring rights upon a restricted locality but to become 
operative only in the event of an affirmative vote by the people of such 
locality. " 
In Ex parte Wall, supra, the court said : "To say that the 
legislators may deem a law to be expedient, provided the people shall 
deem it expedient, is to suggest an abandonment of the legislative 
function by those to whose wisdom and patriotism_ the Constitution 
has intrusted the prerogative of determining whether a law is or is 
not expedient. . . . A statute to take effect upon a subsequent event, 
when it comes from the hands of the Legislature, must be a law in 
praes~nti_ to take effect in futuro. On the question of the expediency 
of the law 1 the Legislature must exercise its own judgment definitely 
and finally. If it can be made to take effect on the oc c urrence of an 
event, the Legislature must declare the law expedient if the event 
shall happen, but inexpedient if it sh all not happen. They can appeal to 
no other man or men to judge for them in relation to its present or 
future propriety or necessity ; they must exercise that power themselves, 
and thus perform the duty imposed upon by the Constitution. But in case 
of a law to take effect if it shall be approved by a popular vote, no 
event affecting the expedience of the law is expected to happen. The 
expediency of wisdom of the law, abstractly considered, does not depend 
on a vote of the people . If it is unwise before the vote is taken, it is 
equally unwise afterward. The Legislature has no more right to refer 
such a question to the whole people than to a single individual. " 
"Where an enactment of the General Assembly, approved by the 
Governor, provided for its submission to a vote of the people as to 
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whe ther it should become a law or not, it wa s held that this provisi on 
was void and the vote of the pro ple pursua nt thereto wi tho ut legal 
effect, and that th e ena c tment became a la w whe n it passed the two 
houses and was approved by the Governor O a Santo Vo Stat e, 2 Iowa, 
165, 63 Amo Dec . 487; Stat e Vo Beneke, 9 Iowa, 2030 
"In Opinions of the Justices, 160 Mas so 586 , 36 N. Eo 488, 
23 L. R. A. 113, the j ustices of the Supreme Judici al Court of Ma ss a-
chusetts were required to give their opini on to the Hou se of Repr esen tati ve s 
upo n the question: "Is it constitutional, in an act granting to women the 
right to vote in town and ci ty elections , to provide such act shall take effect 
th roughout the comrnonwealth upon its accep tance by a majority vote of 
th e vote rs of th e whole commonwea lth?" Fiv e of the judges ans we red this 
questio n in the negative united in an opinion in which they used the following 
language: 11 lt is true that a general la w can be pa sse d by the legi s lature, 
to take effect upon the happe ning of a subs equent event. Whether this 
subsequent even t can be the adoption of the law by a vote of the people has 
occ as ioned sorne differen ces of opinion, but the we ight of authority is that 
a general law cannot be made to tak e effec t in thi s manner o Whether s uch 
legislation is submitted to th e people a s a propo sal for a la w, to be voted 
upon by them, and to become a law if th ey approve it, or, a s a law, to 
take effect if they vote to approve it, the substa nce of the transa c tion is 
that the legislative department dec lines to tak e th e re sponsibility of pa ssi ng 
the la w; but the la w has force, if at all, in conseq uence of the votes of the 
peopleo They, ulti mately, are the legislatorso It seems to us tha t by the 
cons titution the senate and th e house of represen tatives have been made 
the legislative department of the governm ent, and that there ha s not been 
reserv ed to the people an y direct part in legislation o" 
The cases of Brawner Vo Supervisors of Elections , 141 Mdo 586, 
119 A. 250, and State Vo Haye s, 61 N. H. 264, a re oth er decisions that, 
the people of the st at e having delegated to the Legis lat ure th e power of 
making its la ws , that body cannot re delegat e to th e people .them se lves 
the power and authority thus conf erre d upon it by making the validity of 
a statute affecting the whole state dependent upon a vot e of the people. In 
Lock e's Appeal, , 72 Pao 508, 13 Am. Rep o 716, it is said tha t, if th e 
Legi sl at ure can del egat e the law maki ng power to a ma jority of the voters , 
it c an also confer s uch power upon the minority; and in Matt er of Bor ough 
of West Philad elphis , 5 Watts & S. (Pa.) 283, it was s aid : "Under a well-
balanced co nstitut ion, the legislature can no more delegate its prop er 
function than can the judiciary. " 
"An act of th e Legi slature need not go into effec t immediately on its 
pa ssage , and, indeed, under th e Con stitution, it cannot take effe c t until 
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the 1st day of July next after its passage, unless in case of emergency, 
to be expressed in the act, the General Assembly shall by a vote of 
two-thirds of all the members elected to each house otherwise direct. 
The Legislature may direct when an act shall take effect, and it may 
direct that it shall take effect upon the happening of a certain continge ncy 
or future event, and the nature of the contingency or future event is 
immaterial if it is legal. A favorable vote of the people of the state 
is not, however, such a contingency or future event, as was held in 
Barto V. Himrod, supra o 
"While the cases of Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville Railroa d 
Co. v. Clinton County Com'rs, supra, and People v. Kennedy, supra, 
hold as so thoroughly established as to need no discussion that general 
powers of legislation are conferred exclusively upon the Legislature, 
and that this body may not escape its duties and responsibilities by 
delegating such legislative powers to the people at large, it is equally 
well established that an act of the Legislature is not unconstitutional 
because byits terms it is to take effect only after it shall have been 
approved by the vote of the people of the locality affected. 11 
"The two parts of the act? the one providing for a jury list of 
electors of both sexes and the other providing for the submission of 
the proposition to the voters, cannot be separated and the former 
held good and the latter invalid, as was done by the Supreme Court of 
Iowa in Santo v o State, supra, and State v. Beneke, suprao The genera l 
Assembly did not pass a law dec laring that women should be jurors. 
It abdicated its -authority for the time being, and passed the responsibili ty 
on to the people. It made an effort to accomplish a single purpose in a 
particular way, and, the way having been found inadequate and unconsti-
tutional, the court has no right to disregard the condition annexed to the 
act and declare the act valid in spite of the failure of the conditiono 
There is no reason to suppose the General Assembly would have passed 
the bill with the provision for a referendum omittedo 
"We ho ld that, under the Constitution of Illinois, the General 
Assembly is the sole depository of the legislative power of the state; 
that it has no power to delegate its general legislative power, and 
may not refer a general act of legislation to a vote of the people of 
the state to decide whether it shall have effect as a law except where 
the Constitution requires such reference; that the rule against the 
delegation of legislative power is not violated by vesting in municipal 
corporations certain powers of legislation on subjects of purely local 
concern connected with their municipal affairs, nor by local option 
laws, the application of which to particular localities is made depende nt 
upon their adoption by the voters of such localities, and that the act of 
.. 
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June 14, 1929, to amend section 2 of an act to authori z e judges of 
courts of r ecord to appoint jury commissioners, and prescribing 
their powe r s and duties, is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
powers, and had no effect to change the Jury Commi ss ioner s Act or to 
authorize the selection of women as jurors. 
"The writ of mandamus will issue as prayed. 
"Writ awarded. " 
Of cou r s e , amendments to the Stat e Constitution itself would modify the rule 
either by Article XIII "Of Amendment s " or by constitutional convention in re. Con-
stitutional Convention 55 R . I. 56, 17 SA 433 (1935 ). Since the second method of 
amendment , much simpler than the first, is first instituted by a majority of the 
General Ass embly and then followed through by a popular vote, it could easily be 
confused with a referendum as to a piece of legislation. But the question here is 
that effectuating a particular kind of legislation not amending the State Constitution. 
Furthermore, amendment XXX I of the State Constitution spec ifically forbids 
the General Assembly from borrowing in peace time more than Fifty Thousand 
Dollars ($50, 000. 00) without a popular vote as to each issue . This is a constitution -
ally authorized referendum. 
In my quotation from People ex r el Thomson v. Barnett the co ur t was careful 
not to invalidate legislation for a particular city, to wn or county Le . lo c al option 
provi si ons. Hence, I am sure that a statute of the Rhode Island General Assembly 
allo wing a city or town to c arry out fa ir hou s ing by ordinance would be valid . 
I 
Respectfully, 
FRANCIS B. KEENEY , JR . 
FBKjr:j 
